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Abstract
A promising approach to hedge against the inherent uncertainty of renewable generation is
to equip the renewable plants with energy storage systems. This paper focuses on designing
profit maximization offering strategies, i.e., the strategies that determine the offering price
and volume, for a storage-assisted renewable power producer that participates in hour-ahead
electricity market. Designing the strategies is challenging since (i) the underlying problem is
coupled across time due to the evolution of the storage level, and (ii) inputs to the problem
including the renewable output and market clearing price are unknown when submitting offers.
Following the competitive online algorithm design approach, we first study a basic setting where
the renewable output and the clearing price are known for the next hour. We propose sOffer,
a simple online offering strategy that achieves the best possible competitive ratio of O(log θ),
where θ is the ratio between the maximum and the minimum clearing prices. Then, we consider
the case where the clearing price is unknown. By exploiting the idea of submitting multiple
offers to combat price uncertainty, we propose mOffer, and demonstrate that the competitive
ratio of mOffer converges to that of sOffer as the number of offers grows. Finally, we extend
our approach to the scenario where the renewable output has forecasting error. We propose
gOffer as the generalized offering strategy and characterize its competitive ratio as a function
of the forecasting error. Our trace-driven experiments demonstrate that our algorithms achieve
performance close to the offline optimal and outperform a baseline alternative significantly.
1 Introduction
Nowadays, renewable power producers, such as wind farms and solar plants, are being rapidly
integrated to the power system. In 2015, investment on renewables sets a record of 296 billion
dollars, more than double the amount for fossil fuels [9]. Renewables are attractive in that they
are clean, free (except capital and maintenance cost), and inexhaustible. Integration of renewables
into the power system and particularly in the electricity market, however, is challenging since their
generation is uncontrollable, intermittent, and unpredictable. A promising approach to facilitate
the renewable integration and hedge against the uncertainty, is to equip the renewable plants with
the giant energy storage systems [14, 15]. Some examples are the storage stations at Southern
California (with capacity of 40MWh), South Korea (16MWh), and Germany (15MWh) [1].
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In several existing electricity markets, renewable power producers receive guaranteed feed-in tariffs,
e.g., “take-all-wind” policy in California’s electricity market [3]. “take-all-wind” policy guarantees
that the market absorbs the entire renewable supply at favorable fixed prices. This policy is feasible
since the current market share of the renewables is not significant, at most 19.2%, on average around
the world, in 2015 [9].
The extra-market treatment policy, however, is not viable in future. Recently, the deployment cost
of the renewables is dropping rapidly, e.g., the price of solar panel has fallen by 80% from 2008 to
2016 [2]. This reduction in price along with the environmental concerns pushes rapid penetration
of the renewables, e.g., in Denmark, the plan is to achieve 50% and 100% renewable generation
in 2020 and 2050, respectively [7]. Hence, in eventual market with the considerable renewables’
market share, it is inevitable to treat renewable producers the same as other traditional generation
companies [20].
Several electricity markets such as NYISO [5], CAISO [3], and Nord Pool [6] operate in a multi-
settlement manner and settle transactions at multiple timescales, i.e., day-ahead, hour-ahead [17,
19], and real-time. Considering the uncertainty of renewable output, srGENCO tends to par-
ticipate in short-term market, specifically hour-ahead market, without suffering profit reduction
caused by long-term forecasting errors [20]. In reality, CAISO’s Participating Intermittent Re-
source Program (PIRP [3]) is already requiring wind power plants to bid into their hour-ahead
market. In hour-ahead market operation, the generation companies including renewable producers
submit their offers (including offering price and offering volume) for selling the electricity in the
next hour (see Sec. 2.1 for more details on the hour-ahead market operation). This work focuses on
designing offering strategies, i.e., the strategies that determine the offering price and volume, for
Storage-assisted Renewable GENeration COmpany (srGENCO) that participates in hour-ahead
market.
As depicted in Fig. 1, we consider a scenario in which an srGENCO, like other traditional gen-
eration companies, participates in hour-ahead market by (1) submitting the offer. After receiving
the offers, (2) the market operator matches the offers with the bids from the demand-side and
announces a market clearing price. If the offering price of srGENCO is less than the clearing
price, (3) its offering volume is considered as the commitment to the market for the next hour. In
turn, srGENCO is paid according to the clearing price.
Storage-assisted 
Renewable Generation Company
(SRGENCO)
Hour-ahead 
Electricity
 Market
1) Submit offer 
2) Announce clearing price 
3) Commit to market 
Figure 1: The scenario
Finding profit maximization offering strategy for a renewable producer without storage, is nontrivial
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due to the inherent uncertainty of the renewables and dynamics in the market clearing price. In
the presence of storage, the offering strategy is even more challenging because of the additional
design space enabled by the storage. More specifically, at first, srGENCO can use the storage to
compensate for the slots that the renewable output cannot fulfill the commitment. In addition, the
storage can potentially offer another economic advantage. That is, it can shift the energy through
absorbing the renewable output during low price periods, and then discharge it during the high
price periods. In this way, designing profit maximization offering strategy in the presence of storage
comes with wider design space than those without the storage and potentially can bring more profit
for srGENCO.
To design the offering strategy, this paper casts an optimization problem with the objective of
maximizing the long-term profit of srGENCO subject to the storage capacity constraints. The
inputs to the problem, i.e., the renewable output and the clearing price, however, are unknown for
srGENCO when submitting offer. This emphasizes the need for online solution design which is
challenging, since the problem is coupled across time due to the evolution of the storage. We note
that some similar problems have been studied in literature using offline [13, 18] and stochastic
optimization approaches [19, 20]. We refer to Sec. 2.4 for details.
By introducing the system model and problem formulation in Sec. 2, this work tackles the profit
maximization offering strategy problem following online competitive algorithm design [12] and
makes the following contributions:
1. In Sec. 3, we study a basic setting where the exact values of renewable output and the clearing
price for the next slot are known to srGENCO before submitting the offer. Even under this
idealized setting, solving the problem is still challenging since the input to problem is still
unknown for future slots beyond the next one. We propose sOffer, a simple online offering
strategy, in which the offering volume is calculated through a piecewise exponential/constant
function of the renewable output and the current storage level, as well as the clearing price
of the next slot. Our analysis demonstrates that sOffer achieves the best possible competitive
ratio of O(log θ), where θ is the ratio between the maximum and minimum clearing prices.
2. In Sec. 4.1, we study the case where the clearing price is unknown and propose mOffer. In
mOffer, srGENCO submits multiple offers, each of which conveys a portion of the total
offering volume, at different offering prices. Our analysis shows that the competitive ratio of
mOffer converges to the ratio of sOffer as the number of offers grows. Moreover, in Sec. 4.2, our
approach is extended to the case where srGENCO knows renewable output with forecasting
error. We propose gOffer as the generalized offering strategy and characterize the competitive
ratio as a function of the maximum forecasting error.
3. In Sec. 5, by extensive numerical experiments based on real-world traces, we show that our
online offering strategies can achieve satisfactory performance as compared to the offline
optimum. In addition, gOffer with 10% forecasting error improves the profit of srGENCO
by 15% as compared to the baseline scenario without storage. As notable observations, our
experiments demonstrate that when the market clearing price is unknown, submitting 3 offers
is sufficient to achieve almost the same performance as the case that the market price is known.
Moreover, forecasting error of more than 20% significantly degrades the performance results.
In summary, our observations demonstrate that, while the uncertainty in market price can be
effectively handled by multiple offer submissions, accurate short-term renewable forecasting
is vital for srGENCO to obtain a desired profit.
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Table 1: Summary of key notations
Notation Description
t Index of one-hour time slot
T The number of time slots, T ≥ 0
T Set T = {1, 2, . . . , T}
p(t)
Market clearing price at t,
pmin ≤ p(t) ≤ pmax
θ
The ratio between the maximum
and the minimum clearing prices,
θ = pmax/pmin
u(t)
The renewable output of
srGENCO at t
C The capacity of storage system
ρc
The maximum charging rate of
storage system
ρd
The maximum discharging rate of
storage system
z(t)
The storage level at the beginning of
t, see Eq. (2)
pˆ(t)
optimization variable, offering
price of srGENCO at t
xˆ(t)
optimization variable, offering
volume of srGENCO at t
x(t)
Commitment volume of srGENCO
at t, see Eq. (1)
y(t)
Over-commitment volume of
srGENCO at t, see Eq. (5)
R(t)
The net profit of srGENCO at t,
see Eq. (6)
We conclude the paper in Sec. 6. Due to space limitation, all proofs are included in our technical
report [10].
2 Model and Problem Formulation
2.1 Hour-Ahead Electricity Market
The hour-ahead market operates in hourly basis1 and srGENCO along with other generation
companies submits its offer, including the offering price and the offering volume (see Sec. 2.2.2 for
details), for the forthcoming hour shortly before the operation time. The market operator (usually
1We emphasize that our model works in short-term market in which the offers are submitted before actual market
operation in hourly or even shorter scales, e.g., 15 or 5 minutes ahead. For real examples we refer to California
ISO [3] and Nord Pool Markets [6]. For a survey of electricity markets, we refer to [17].
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known as independent system operator, ISO) matches the offers collected from the generation
companies with the received bids from the demand-side, e.g., utility companies. Then, using a
well-established double auction mechanism [21] it determines the market clearing price for the next
hour. The generation companies with the offering prices less than the clearing price are successful
and the offering volume of electricity is considered as their commitment to be sold on the market
at the clearing price. Thus, successful offers sell at price at least as high as what they offered. All
the remaining offers fail since their offering prices are greater than the clearing price.
Formally, we consider a time-slotted model, such that the time horizon T is chopped into multiple
slots with equal length, e.g., 1 hour, each of which is indexed by t. Shortly before slot t, srGENCO
along with other participants submits its offer, for the next slot. The ISO determines the clearing
price p(t) shortly after the participants submit their offers and bids. We assume pmin ≤ p(t) ≤ pmax,
and parameter θ is defined as the ratio between the maximum and the minimum clearing prices,
i.e., θ = pmax/pmin. We later use θ to analyze our algorithms.
2.2 The properties of srGENCO
There is a Storage-assisted Renewable GENeration COmpany (srGENCO) that produces electric-
ity from the renewable sources such as wind farm or solar plant. At the same time srGENCO is
equipped with the storage systems to store the electricity for future commitment with potentially
higher price. On the other hand, the storage could be discharged to compensate for the shortage
of renewable output when the commitment to the market is beyond the renewable output.
2.2.1 Renewable Output
The renewable output of srGENCO at slot t is denoted by u(t) and we do not rely on any specific
stochastic model of u(t). In general, we assume that srGENCO does not know the exact amount
of u(t) when submitting the offer. Note that u(t) could be (i) directly committed to the market,
(ii) be committed to the market partially while the residual is stored on the storage, or (iii) entirely
be stored on the storage for future usage.
2.2.2 Offering Strategy
By offering strategy we mean the way that srGENCO determines its offer that includes:
(i) Offering price denoted as pˆ(t) ∈ [pmin, pmax], i.e., the minimum price at which srGENCO
desires to commit electricity to the market.
(ii) Offering volume denoted as xˆ(t) ≥ 0, i.e., the amount of electricity in MWh at which
srGENCO offers to the market at slot t.2
We distinguish between the offering volume and the commitment volume. After the clearing price
p(t) is revealed, srGENCO’s offer may or may not be successful. If the offer is successful the offering
volume is considered as the commitment volume. Otherwise, there would be no commitment. More
2Note that there is no upper bound for xˆ(t) because we assume that the market is big enough to absorb the
offering volume of srGENCO entirely.
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specifically, we define x(t) as the commitment volume of srGENCO at slot t as
x(t) =
{
xˆ(t) if p(t) ≥ pˆ(t),
0 otherwise.
(1)
The goal of this study is to design an offering strategy for srGENCO to submit both offering price
pˆ(t) and offering volume xˆ(t) so as to maximize its long-term profit.
2.2.3 Storage Model
We denote the maximum capacity of storage system of srGENCO by C and let ρc and ρd be its
maximum charging and discharge rates, respectively. In addition, let z(t) ∈ [0, C] be the storage
level at the beginning of slot t. Given the renewable output u(t) and the commitment volume x(t),
the evolution of the storage level of srGENCO is given by
z(t+ 1) =
[
z(t) + xc(t)− xd(t)
]
C
, (2)
where
xc(t) = min
{
ρc,
[
u(t)− x(t)]+}, (3)
is the charging amount of the storage at slot t,
xd(t) = min
{
ρd,
[
x(t)− u(t)]+}, (4)
and xd(t) is the discharging amount of the storage at slot t. Moreover, [.]
+ and [.]C define the pro-
jections onto the positive orthant and set C = [0, C], respectively. Since srGENCO is empowered
by the storage, the commitment volume x(t) might be either greater, less, or equal to the renewable
output u(t). The evolution of the storage for each case is as follows:
(i) u(t) = x(t): in this case the entire renewable output is committed to the market and there is
no change on the storage level, i.e., z(t+ 1) = z(t).
(ii) u(t) > x(t): in this case, u(t)− x(t) > 0 represents the amount of the surplus in the renewable
output. Ideally, this surplus must be charged into the storage for the forthcoming commitments.
However, because of the charging rate ρc it may not be possible, which is indeed captured in Eq. (3).
(iii) u(t) < x(t): in this case not only the entire renewable output is committed, but also the
storage should contribute in fulfilling the residual commitment, i.e., x(t)− u(t) > 0. Again, given
the storage level z(t), and the discharge rate ρd, the residual commitment may not be satisfied.
2.2.4 Over-Commitment
Recall that srGENCO does not know the exact renewable output u(t) when submitting the offer,
hence, it may fail to fulfill its commitment, which we refer to as the over-commitment. Let us
denote y(t) as the over-commitment volume at t expressed as
y(t) =
[
x(t)−
(
u(t) + min
{
z(t), ρd
})]+
. (5)
Note that the maximum amount that srGENCO can provide to the market in operation time t is
the aggregation of the renewable output u(t) and the maximum amount that could be discharged
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from the storage, i.e., min
{
z(t), ρd
}
. Since u(t) is unknown to srGENCO when submitting the
offer, the commitment volume x(t) might be greater than the amount that srGENCO can really
output, i.e., u(t) + min
{
z(t), ρd
}
.
2.3 Profit Model
By committing x(t), the profit obtained by srGENCO is p(t)x(t). The consequence of over-
commitment is captured in profit model by augmenting a penalty term. We adopt the penalty
model in [20], in which the unit penalty payment in over-commitment is linearly proportional to
the spot price p(t) in the form of α1p(t) + α2, where α1, α2 ≥ 0 are constants.
Concluding above, the net profit obtained by srGENCO at slot t, denoted by R(t), is expressed
as total profit subtracted by the (potential) penalty of the over-commitment, i.e.,
R(t) = p(t)x(t)− (α1p(t) + α2)y(t). (6)
2.4 Profit Maximization Problem
The objective is to maximize the cumulative profit obtained by srGENCO over time horizon T .
The profit maximization offering strategy problem (HA-CSP) is formally casted as
HA− CSP max
∑
t∈T
R(t), s.t. Eq. (2),
vars. pˆ(t) ∈ [pmin, pmax], xˆ(t) ≥ 0, t ∈ T .
In offline scenario, in which the values of u(t) and p(t) as the time-varying inputs to the problem are
known ahead of time, the problem is a linear one which is easy to solve. We refer to [13, 18] as the
related works that study related problems in offline settings. We note that in the offline scenario, the
clearing prices are known to srGENCO, hence it is not require to submit the offering price anymore.
Consequently, the offering strategy reduces to announcing the commitment volume directly. In this
way, the problem could be reformulated in an equivalent form with simpler structure.
In real-world, however, neither the renewable output u(t) nor the clearing price p(t) are revealed
to srGENCO when submitting the offer. Hence the focus in this paper is to tackle the problem
in online setting, so, we formulate the problem in a way that srGENCO submits both offering
price and offering volume. Solving HA-CSP in online setting is challenging, since the problem is
coupled over the time in the presence of the storage system. Recall that an important advantage
of incorporating storage towards profit maximization is to (fully or partially) store the renewable
supply in the storage when that market price is low, and discharge it when the market price is
high. Without knowing the future values of p(t) and u(t), finding a profit maximization offering
strategy, that implicitly determines how renewable supply and the stored electricity in the storage
must be consumed is challenging.
Finally, we note that in [19, 20], following Markov decision process and approximate dynamic
programming, different offering strategies are proposed given a particular probabilistic model of
the clearing price and the renewable output. In these approaches, the solution is obtained in
the sense of probabilistic expectation. In practice, however, real values might deviate from the
underlying probabilistic models. Our general approach as explained in Sec. 2.5 has no assumptions
on the stochastic modeling of the unknown time-varying inputs.
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2.5 Our Approach: Online Competitive Algorithm Design
Our approach in this study is to follow competitive online algorithm design and propose online
offering strategies in which the decision is made based on only the current information, and without
any assumptions on the stochastic model on the renewable output and the clearing price. For the
performance analysis, we use competitive ratio [12] which is a well-established metric to evaluate
how good is the online solution.
Definition 1 When the underlying problem is a profit maximization one, for an online algorithm
A, its competitive ratio (cr) is defined as the maximum ratio between offline optimum and the
profit obtained by A, over all inputs, i.e.,
cr(A) , max
ω∈Ω
ROFA(ω)
RA(ω)
, (7)
where ω ∈ Ω refers to an instance of the online input parameters as
ω ,
[
ω(t) = (u(t), p(t))
]
t∈T , (8)
and Ω is the set of all input instances. Moreover, ROFA(ω) and RA(ω) are the profits earned by the
optimal offline solution and the online algorithm A respectively, when the input is ω.
By this definition, the smaller the competitive ratio, the better the performance is, since it guaran-
tees no matter what the input is, the online optimal strategy obtains the profit close to the offline
optimum.
3 Optimal Online Offering Strategy with Accurate Single-Slot
Prediction
In this section, we propose online competitive algorithms for a simplified version of HA-CSP, in
which the accurate data for the next slot is available for both the renewable supply and the clearing
price. Later in Sec. 4, based on the insights from result of this section on the simplified scenario,
we tackle the general case and propose online algorithms with neither the renewable supply nor the
clearing price known to srGENCO when submitting the bids.
3.1 Simplified Problem with Accurate Single-Slot Prediction
For the sake of simplification in design, we first assume that both p(t) and u(t) values for the next
slot are revealed to srGENCO, perhaps by accurate short-term forecasting tools. In this way,
HA-CSP is largely simplified in two ways:
(i) since p(t) is known, the offering strategy reduces to finding just the commitment amount x(t).
We relax this assumption in Sec.4.1.
(ii) since u(t) is known, all the inputs and variables in Eq. (5) are known to srGENCO when
submitting the offer, hence the over-commitment never happens, thereby the penalty term in
the objective of HA-CSP vanishes. We relax this assumption in Sec. 4.2.
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Since in the new setting the price p(t) is known for the next slot, and to be consistent with the
general formulation, we set pˆ(t) = p(t) and following Eq. (1), we get x(t) = xˆ(t). Then, given the
above assumptions, the only optimization variable would be the commitment amount x(t). Now,
we cast the simplified offering strategy problem sOSP as
sOSP max
∑
t∈T
p(t)x(t)
s.t. x(t) ≤ min{z(t), ρD}+ u(t),
z(t+ 1) =
[
z(t) + xc(t)− xd(t)
]
C
,
var : x(t) ≥ 0, t ∈ T ,
where the first constraint ensures that over-commitment never happens. And the second constrain
involves the evolution of the storage level, where xc(t) and xd(t) defined in Eqs. (3)-(4) represent
the charging and discharging amounts at time t.
Remarks. (1) Even though sOSP is simplified, it is still challenging and non-trivial in online
setting. That is, for sOSP the forthcoming values for two inputs p(τ) and u(τ) for τ ∈ {t+ 1, . . . , T}
are unknown, thereby the problem is still online, and again it cannot be decomposed across the
time because of the evolution of the storage.
(2) sOSP is closely related to the classical time series search and one-way trading problems [16, 22].3
As compared to these classical problems, sOSP can be characterized as a generalized version in two
aspects: (i) sOSP introduces another exogenous parameter u(t) in addition to the clearing price
p(t), this means that the adversary has more freedom to choose the worst-case input, this makes
the competitive analysis more challenging; (ii) sOSP introduces the capacity constraint associated
with the storage system. Putting together both differences, our investigations (see Sec. 3.3.1)
demonstrate that neither fixed-threshold policy, i.e., the policy that finds a fixed exchange rate and
will accept the rates above that, nor the competitive analysis approach proposed in [16] yields the
optimal solution for sOSP in this paper. Instead, the optimal strategy for sOSP admits an adaptive-
threshold-based policy that achieves the optimal competitive ratio as a logarithmic function of θ,
whose details are stated in the next section.
3.2 Online Algorithm Design for sOSP
In this section, we propose a simple online offering strategy (sOffer) to solve sOSP. Then we analyze
its competitiveness and show that sOffer achieves the best competitive ratio.
3.2.1 High Level Intuitions
Intuitively, a proper offering strategy must consider two issues in decision making:
(i) the clearing price p(t) for the incoming slot t, the higher the price, the more the srGENCO
is willing to commit,
3In one-way trading problem, a trader needs to exchange from one currency to another currency, given a time-
varying exchange rates arriving online. The trader can decide to accept the current price or wait for the more
attractive prices in future. The time series search problem is also quite similar [16, 22].
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Algorithm 1 —sOffer
[
p(t), u(t), z(t)
]
1: z+(t)← min{z(t) + u(t), C}
2: pˆ(t)← g(z+(t)); see Eqs. (9) and (10) for the optimal design of g(z)
3: calculate xˆ(t) according to pˆ(t), see Eq. (13) and the following analysis for the optimal design
4: pˆ(t)← p(t)
5: submit offer
(
pˆ(t), xˆ(t)
)
;
C z
g(z)
pmin
pmax
(a)
C z
g(z)
pmin
pmax
(b)
C
g(z)
pmin
pmax
cth z
(c)
Figure 2: Different structures of function g(z).
(ii) the storage level z(t), if the storage level is almost full, srGENCO would be more interested
to commit to have more capacity for the forthcoming slots to store the electricity. On the
other hand, if the storage level is almost unoccupied, srGENCO might keep this electricity
to commit with higher price in future slots.
Putting together both clearing price and the storage level, we design our algorithm following an
adaptive threshold-based strategy, since it adaptively changes the offering volume based on the
current storage level and the clearing price.
3.2.2 Main Algorithm
The main idea is to construct a function g(z) : [0, C]→ [pmin, pmax].4 The input to function g(·) is
the aggregation of the incoming renewable supply u(t) and the current storage level z(t), projected
into the capacity of the storage, i.e., min{z(t) + u(t), C}. The output of g(·) is the candidate
offering price pˆ(t) for srGENCO at slot t. Note that since we assume that srGENCO knows
clearing price p(t), it calculates its candidate offering price pˆ(t) and then based on the comparison
between these two values decides how to submit its offer.
The function g(·) should be decreasing, i.e., with the increase in the current storage level, the
offering price would be decreased (see intuition (ii) above). Given function g(z), designing sOffer is
rather straightforward and is summarized as Algorithm 1. At slot t, first, sOffer calculates candidate
offering price pˆ(t) based on the given g(z). Then, it calculates the offering volume, whose details
is explained in Sec. 3.3.3. In Line 4, the offering price is set to pˆ(t) = p(t) to ensure that xˆ(t) is
committed to market anyway. In next, we explain how to design function g(z).
4To be consistent to the notations in this paper, ideally we must denote the function as g(z(t)). However, for
simplicity we drop the slot index t for z(t).
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3.3 The Design of Function g(z)
3.3.1 On the Importance of Designing Function g(z)
First, we highlight that g(z) plays a critical role in sOffer, and the competitive ratio can be improved
by optimizing function g(z). To illustrate the impact of g(z), we investigate the behavior of sOffer
under different structures of function g(z).
(i) g(z) = c, where c ∈ [pmin, pmax], is a constant value as shown in Fig. 2(a). If c > pmin, for
the extreme case where p(t) < c, t ∈ T , it could be easily shown that the profit obtained by the
sOffer is always 0, thereby the competitive ratio would be ∞. On the other hand, c = pmin, the
competitive ratio is upper bounded by pmax/pmin, which is not intriguing, since srGENCO always
commits the electricity to the market regardless of the clearing price and, it loses the opportunity
of utilizing the potentials of storage in obtaining more profit.
Consequently, an intelligent function design aims to improve the competitiveness by reserving the
storage for forthcoming slots with higher clearing price. This goal can be achieved by adopting a
decreasing function.
(ii) g(z) = az + pmax, where a < 0, as depicted in Fig. 2(b). Again, under the extreme case,
cr(sOffer)→∞ if p(t) = pmin. Note that this linear structure for g(z) is one example and any
strictly decreasing function with g(0) = pmax and g(C) = pmin behaves similarly in the worst case.
(iii) Another smart alternative is a piece-wise function as depicted in Fig. 2(c). Function g(z) again
is decreasing initially. However, after the storage level reaches to a threshold value cth, g(z) changes
to a constant function, i.e.,
g(z) =
{
gˆ(z) if z ≤ cth,
pmin z ≥ cth. (9)
Now, finding the optimal function g(z) reduces to finding gˆ(z) and cth. In the next, we introduce
this function. Moreover in Sec. 3.4, we analyze the competitiveness of the algorithm and prove that
the proposed function achieves the optimal cr.
3.3.2 Optimal Design of Function g(z)
The following theorem summarizes our main contribution in this section.
Theorem 3.1 By setting gˆ(z) in Eq. (9) as
gˆ(z) = pmine
(cth−z)cth
C(C−cth) , (10)
and cth as
cth = C − (2 + log θ)C −
√
log2 θ + 4 log θC
2
> 0, (11)
sOffer achieves the optimal competitive ratio for sOSP as
cr(sOffer) =
(2 + log θ) +
√
log2 θ + 4 log θ
2
. (12)
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C
z
g(z)
p(t)
pˆ(t)
pmin
pmax
z(t) + u(t) cth
xˆ(t)
Figure 3: Illustration of calculating the offering volume xˆ(t) when p(t) > pˆ(t).
The proof is given as the competitive analysis in Sec. 3.4.
Remark. The theorem shows that the competitive ratio is proportional to a logarithmic function
of θ as the ratio between the maximum and minimum clearing prices. In practice, the scale of θ
varies from 2 to 50 in different markets, e.g., the clearing prices in PJM [8] and NYISO [5] in July,
2015 is in [$13.9, $186.9] and [$8.1, $43.1] per MWh. Given θ = 50, the competitive ratio is around
5.74. Our experimental results depict much lower empirical ratios using the real prices in different
markets. For details we refer to Table 3.
3.3.3 Calculating the Offering Volume
Given the optimal function g(z) in Theorem 3.1, we can finally find the offering volume xˆ(t) as
follows.
xˆ(t) =
[ρc − u(t)]+, if pˆ(t)>p(t),
z(t)+u(t)−min{cth, z(t)+ρc}, if pˆ(t)=p(t)=pmin,
z(t)+u(t)−min{gˆ−1(p(t)), z(t)+ρc}, if pˆ(t)<p(t),
(13)
where gˆ−1(p(t)) is well-defined since gˆ(z) defined in Eq. (9) is monotonically decreasing. More
specifically, when pˆ(t) > p(t), srGENCO stores the renewable supply as much as it can, considering
the charging rate constraint ρc, then, the residual is committed to the market. If pˆ(t) = p(t) = pmin,
it means that the storage level exceeds the threshold level cth, so, srGENCO offers the minimum
price pmin. Since the market price is also pmin it commits the electricity until the storage level
reaches the threshold cth or z(t)+ρc, i.e., xˆ(t) = z(t)+u(t)−min{cth, z(t)+ρc}. Finally, the last
situation is pˆ(t) < p(t), and p(t) > pmin. In this case, we are in the exponential part of function
g(z) and xˆ(t) is calculated as the total supply u(t) + z(t) subtracted by min{gˆ−1(p(t)), z(t)+ρc}.
An illustration of the offering volume in this case when gˆ−1(p(t)) ≤ z(t)+ρc is depicted in Fig. 3.
Finally, to capture the maximum discharge rate of the storage, it suffices to modify offering volume
as xˆ(t) = min{u(t) + ρd, xˆ(t)}.
3.4 Competitive Analysis
Our goal in this section is to design function g(z) (especially gˆ(z) and cth in Eq. (9)) so as to
minimize the competitive ratio. By doing so we prove the result in Theorem 3.1. To simplify our
explanation in this section and without loss of generality, we quantize the energy-related variables
x(t) and z(t) and the input parameters u(t) and C to take the integer values. More specifically,
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considering that C is a real number, we can define discretized capacity Cd as
Cd = C/η, (14)
where η is the unit of electricity. In this way, Cd belongs to integer numbers. To avoid notation
complexity, however, in our analysis in this section, we abuse notation C to denote the discretized
Cd. Similarly, we abuse x(t), z(t), and u(t) as their discretized versions. Finally, we assume that
initially the storage is full.
An immediate consequence of the above discretization is that function g(z) could be considered
as a step function. We assume that there are n steps for g(z), each of which indexed by i, and
i ∈ N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Generally, the length of each step could be different, hence, let us denote
by li as the length of step i. We can characterize the threshold value c
th defined in Eq. (9) as the
storage capacity subtracted by the length of the last step, i.e.,
cth = C − ln. (15)
Moreover, we define bi =
∑i
k=1 lk as the cumulative length until step i. Since z ∈ [0, C] we get
C = bn =
∑n
k=1 lk. Finally, we denote pi = g(bi) as the threshold price when the storage level is bi
under function g(·). By this definition, we get p1 = pmax and pn = pmin.
By zsOfferω (t), we denote the storage level at slot t under sOffer, and a particular instance ω as defined
in Eq. (8). Let us denote the minimum storage level that sOffer reaches under ω as b ∈ {0, 1, . . . , C},
i.e., mint∈T zsOfferω (t) = b. Then, using this definition, we can partition the universal set of input
instances Ω to multiple subsets as follows
Ω =
⋃
b∈{0,1,...,C}
ΩsOfferb ,
where ΩsOfferb ,
{
ω ∈ Ω : mint∈T zsOfferω (t) = b
}
.
In particular, subset ΩsOfferb represents the coalition of all input instances that results in the mini-
mum storage level b upon executing the deterministic online algorithm sOffer.
Definition 2 Define the local competitive ratio crb(sOffer) of sOffer under the subset of input
instances ΩsOfferb as
crb(sOffer) , max
ω∈ΩsOfferb
ROFA(ω)
RsOffer(ω)
. (16)
Given Definition 2, we can redefine cr(sOffer) as follows.
Definition 3 Define cr ( sOffer) as the maximum of crb(sOffer) over all subsets Ω
sOffer
b , b ∈ {0, 1, . . . , C},
i.e.,
cr(sOffer) = max
b∈{0,1,...,C}
crb(sOffer). (17)
The following lemma characterizes a closed-form of crb(sOffer) for b ∈ {b1, b2, . . . , bn−1}.
Lemma 3.2 For sOffer, if crbi(sOffer) ≥ crbk(sOffer), k ∈ {i+ 1, i+ 2, . . . , n− 1} and i ≤ n− 1,
then we have:
crbi(sOffer) =
piC +
∑n−1
k=i+1 pklk∑n
k=i+1 pklk
. (18)
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otherwise,
crbi(sOffer) ≥
piC +
∑n−1
k=i+1 pklk∑n
k=i+1 pklk
. (19)
Through the proof of 3.2, we can justify that the competitive ratio takes maximum value only
among the subsets with b = bi, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n− 1}, i.e.,
cr(sOffer) = max
b∈{b1,b2,...,bn−1}
crb(sOffer).
Using the result in Lemma 3.2, we get the global competitive ratio of sOffer under universal set of
instances as follows
cr(sOffer) = max
i∈{1,2,...,n−1}
piC +
∑n−1
k=i+1 pklk∑n
k=i+1 pklk
. (20)
Our goal is to achieve the minimum possible value for cr(sOffer). Our design space toward this
goal is to find: (i) the optimal value for pi which directly characterizes function g(z), recall that by
definition pi = g(bi), and (ii) ln as the length of the last step in function which characterizes the
threshold level cth, recall that we have cth = C − ln.
The following lemma states that the minimum global competitive ratio is achieved when the value
of local competitive ratios are all equal.
Lemma 3.3 Given a fixed l1, l2, . . . , ln, cr(sOffer) minimizes only if the following expression holds:
pn−1C
pnln
=
pn−2C + pn−1ln−1
pnln + pn−1ln−1
= · · · = p1C +
∑n−1
k=2 pklk∑n
k=2 pklk
.
Using the result in Lemma 3.3 and by straightforward calculations, we can express li as
li =
pi−1 − pi
pi
pnCln
pn−1C − pnln , i ∈ {2, 3, . . . , n− 1}. (21)
Given C =
∑n
i=1 li, and combining with (21), we get
C = l1+
pnCln
pn−1C−pnln
n−1∑
i=2
pi−1 − pi
pi
+ln.
Lemma 3.4 When C →∞, the competitive ratio of sOffer takes the minimum value only if pn−1 →
pn.
Recall that C is the discretized version of the original storage capacity, and C → ∞ could be
achieved if we choose sufficiently small unit of electricity η as in Eq. (14). Given the results in
Lemma 3.3 and Lemma 3.4, we have
cr(sOffer) =
C
ln
=
l1
ln
+
C
C−ln
n−1∑
i=2
pi−1−pi
pi
+ 1
≥ C
C−ln log θ + 1. (22)
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It can be verified that the above equation achieves the minimum value when n → ∞, l1 = 0, and
li = 1, i ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1}. Now, if z < C − ln, we have
C − z =
n∑
k=z
lk =
pnCln
pn−1C−pnln
∑n−1
k=z
pk−1−pk
pk
+ ln
≈ ClnC−ln
∫ pz−1
pmin
1
pdp+ ln
= ClnC−ln log
pz−1
pmin
+ ln,
where the second-to-the-last equality holds since the difference between pi and pi−1 would be
arbitrarily small when n → ∞ and li = 1, i ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1}. Note that when 1 < z < C − ln and
g(z) = pz−1, solving the above equation we get the following closed-form for g(z)
g(z) =
{
pmin if z ≥ C − ln,
pmine
(C−ln−z)(C−ln)
Cln otherwise.
(23)
Moreover, according to Eq. (22), we have
ln =
C
cr(sOffer)
=
C
C
C−ln log θ + 1
,
and the closed form for ln is
ln =
(2 + log θ)C −
√
log2 θ + 4 log θC
2
. (24)
Putting together the results in Eqs. (23), (24), and (15), the result in Theorem 3.1 is proved.
4 Online Offering Strategy without Accurate Single-Slot Predic-
tion
In Sec. 4.1, we first extend the previous result to the case that the clearing price p(t) is unknown
to srGENCO when submitting the offer, however, the renewable output u(t) is known accurately.
Second, in Sec. 4.2, we extend the result to the general case that the renewable output is known to
srGENCO with forecasting error.
4.1 mOffer: sOffer with multiple offer submissions; p(t) Is Unknown, u(t) Is
Known
Our general approach in this scenario is to use the potentials of submitting multiple offers which
is allowed in the current markets, e.g., at most 10 offers are permitted for srGENCO in PJM
market [4]. Our approach in this case is to calculate total feasible commitment volume, and then
partition this total amount into multiple offers, each of which conveying a portion of the offering
volume, in different prices. In Algorithm 2, we summarize the detail of mOffer, as the multiple
version of sOffer. In mOffer, we denote B = {(p1, x1), (p2, x2), . . . , (pm, xm)} as the set of multiple
offers submitted by the srGENCO, where m is the maximum number of offers that is permitted
by the market operator. In mOffer, if min{u(t), ρc}+ z(t) > cth, it means that the current storage
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Algorithm 2 —mOffer
[
u(t), z(t)
]
1: declare B ← ∅ as the set of offers
2: if min{u(t), ρc}+ z(t) > cth then
3: B ← {(u(t)+z(t)−cth, pmin)}
4: ∆x← min{cth, u(t) + ρd}/(m− 1)
5: for i← 1 to m− 1 do
6: pi ← g(cth − i∆x)
7: B ← B ∪ {(∆x, pi)}
8: end for
9: else
10: B ← {([u(t)− ρc]+, pmin)}
11: ∆x← [u(t) + min{z(t), ρd}]/(m− 1)
12: for i← 1 to m− 1 do
13: pi ← g(z(t) + u(t)− i∆x)
14: B ← B ∪ {(∆x, pi)}
15: end for
16: end if
17: submit B
level z(t) plus the chargeable renewable supply, i.e., min{u(t), ρc}, exceeds the threshold value
cth, so, we can safely submit the surplus amount with the minimum price (Line 3), and partition
the remaining amount equally in m − 1 offers (Lines 4-8). Otherwise, we submit the excessive
energy [u(t)− ρc]+ at price pmin and partition the residual equally into m− 1 offers (Lines 10-15).
Theorem 4.1 characterizes the competitive ratio of mOffer as a function of cr (sOffer) and the
number of submitted offers m.
Theorem 4.1 The competitive ratio of mOffer is bounded by
cr(mOffer) ≤
(
1 +
cr(sOffer)θ
m2
)
cr(sOffer).
Note that cr(mOffer) → cr(sOffer) as m → ∞. In experiments, we evaluate the impact of the
number of offers on the performance of mOffer.
4.2 gOffer: generalized mOffer; u(t) Is Given with Forecasting Error, p(t) Is
Unknown
Finally, we release the accurate forecasting assumption of the renewable output, and assume that
the error of power generation in the forthcoming slot is bounded in a particular region. Namely
the input to this algorithm is u˜(t) as the predicted value and e(t) as the maximum error, such that
u(t) ∈ [(1− e(t))u˜(t), (1 + e(t))u˜(t)], 0 ≤ e(t) ≤ emax.
Our algorithm gOffer is a simple extension of mOffer, with replacing u(t) with (1 − e(t))u˜(t) as
the minimum possible value for the renewable output. We skip the other details since they are the
same as mOffer. Note that with this input, the algorithm behaves in the most conservative way,
such that the over-commitment never happens. Extending the algorithm to the more aggressive
16
Spring SummerAutumn Winter Whole Year0
2
4
6
8
10
12x 10
4
Pr
of
it (
$)
 
 
Offline
gOffer
FixedOnline
NoStorage
Figure 4: The performance of different algo-
rithms in different seasons
4 6 8 10 121
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
pmax/pmin
Co
m
pe
tiv
e 
Ra
tio
 
 
gOffer
FixedOnline
Theoretical
Figure 5: The competitive ratio as a function
of price volatility
cases that takes into account the risk of over-commitment is part of our future work. In following
theorem we characterizes the competitive ratio of gOffer.
Theorem 4.2 Assuming emax < 0.5, the competitive ratio of gOffer is bounded by cr(gOffer) ≤
1
1−2emaxcr(mOffer).
The proof for Theorem 4.2 is very simple. It’s obvious that the amount of committed energy by
gOffer is always larger than (1− 2emax)xmOffer for any t ∈ T .
Clearly, as emax → 0, we get cr(gOffer)→ cr(mOffer). In experiments, we investigate the impact
of forecasting error on the result of gOffer.
5 Experimental Results
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our online strategies using the real-word traces for
the renewable output and electricity market prices. Our objective is two-fold: (i) to compare the
performance against the optimal offline, a comparison algorithm [22], and a baseline in which there
is no storage, and (ii) to investigate the impact of the system model and algorithm parameters.
5.1 Experimental Settings
5.1.1 Renewable Output and Electricity Market Prices
We use the wind generation data from PJM energy market [8] with the capacity of 10MW. We
note that this is a wind farm in moderate size and the world largest has an operational capacity of
1020MW [11]. The hourly electricity price data are from PJM market for most of the experiments.
We also demonstrated our results for Nord Pool [6] and NYISO [5] markets in Table 3. We note
that the prices exhibit severe seasonal patterns. In particular, the prices are highly volatile, e.g.,
in summer the peak price reaches as high as $396.9/MWh, in 2015. For this reason we evaluate
the performance of our algorithms in different seasons as well.
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Table 2: Summary of comparison algorithms
Algorithm Description
Our algorithms
sOffer
Simplified online offering strategy; p(t)
and u(t) are known
mOffer
sOffer with multiple submissions; p(t) is
unknown, u(t) is known
gOffer
Generalized mOffer; p(t) is unknown,
u(t) is known with error
Comparison Algorithms
OFA Optimal offline solution with storage
NoStorage Optimal offline solution without storage
FixedOnline
Simple online algorithm with fixed
threshold price [22]
5.1.2 Storage Capacity
Unless otherwise specified, the storage capacity is set to 20MWh. The maximum charge and
discharge rates are 10MW. In reality, large scale Compressed Air Energy Storage (CAES) with
similar parameters has been developed to cope with renewable uncertainty [23].
5.1.3 Parameters for the Algorithms
Unless otherwise specified, for mOffer and gOffer, the default value for the number of offers is 10.
This is the common practice in PJM market [4]. Moreover, the maximum forecasting error emax in
gOffer is set to 10%. Finally, we note that each data point in figures is the average results of 100
different runs of the algorithms with T = 360 hours.
5.1.4 Comparison Algorithms
We compare the performance of our algorithm gOffer with three other alternatives: (1) OFA, the
optimal offline solution that is implemented as the benchmark to obtain the empirical competitive
ratio; (2) NoStorage, the optimal offline cost when there is no storage. This is used to evaluate the
economic advantage of integrating the storage; (3) FixedOnline, another simple online algorithm
with a fixed threshold price. Specifically, we follow the approach in [22] and set the threshold of
this simple online algorithm fixed at
√
pminpmax, regardless of the storage level. In this algorithm,
srGENCO commits all the electricity whenever the price is not smaller than this threshold. The
acronyms for all the algorithms are summarized in Table 2.
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Table 3: Summary of Theoretical and Empirical Competitive Ratios on Different Electricity Mar-
kets
Electricity market θ = pmax/pmin Theoretical cr Empirical cr
PJM 13.44 4.37 1.18
NYISO 5.32 3.38 1.14
Nord Pool 3.63 2.95 1.09
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5.2 Experimental Results
5.2.1 Comparison Results across Different Seasons
In this experiment we report the profit obtained by different algorithms in different seasons as
well as the whole year. The result is depicted in Fig. 4. The main observations are: (1) gOffer
achieves 80% of the offline optimum, which shows that it is close to optimal. (2) gOffer outperforms
NoStorage by 15%, which signifies the substantial economic benefit of incorporating the storage.
(3) gOffer outperforms FixedOnline by 42%, which depicts the superiority of our online algorithms
as compared to other “storage-level-oblivious” online alternatives.
5.2.2 Impact of the Price Volatility
The electricity price in the deregulated electricity market exhibits large fluctuation. Theoretically,
large price volatility will degrade the performance of the online algorithm, as the competitive ratio
is an increasing function of θ = pmax/pmin. In this experiment, we present the result under different
values of θ. As shown in Fig. 5, gOffer is robust to price fluctuation with less than 5% increment,
even though the theoretical competitive ratio increases by 44%. Meanwhile, we note that the
empirical competitive ratio of FixedOnline decreases slightly as the θ increases. However, it is on
average 90% larger than that of gOffer, which further signifies the superiority of gOffer. In addition,
we report the result of gOffer for the prices in different markets in Table 3. The result signifies
that the larger the price volatility, the large theoretical and empirical competitive ratios.
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5.2.3 Impact of the Storage Capacity
Storage capacity planning is an important issue that srGENCO’s owner needs to consider, since
the storage is still expensive with the current technology. In this experiment, we vary the storage
capacity from 5 to 50MWh to investigate its impact on the profit of srGENCO. Fig. 6 and Fig. 7
show the empirical competitive ratios and the obtained profits, respectively. As the storage capacity
increases, an increase in profit of both online algorithms is observed. However, the increase in gOffer
is smaller (3%) than that of FixedOnline (90%). This is mainly because FixedOnline is completely
oblivious to the storage level, and with the increase in capacity, there would be more room to
mitigate this unawareness. Meanwhile, the empirical competitive ratio of gOffer increases with
large storage capacity (from 1.03 to 1.18). This result depicts that when the capacity is in the
order of the renewable capacity (say, ×0.5 to ×2), gOffer is close-to-optimal. However, when the
storage capacity is much higher than the renewable capacity (say, ×5), perhaps more sophisticated
algorithms are required.
5.2.4 Impact of the Uncertainty of the Clearing Price and the Renewable Output
In the last set of experiments we investigate the impact of the number of offers in mOffer (in Fig. 8)
and the forecasting error in gOffer (in Fig. 9). In mOffer, we relaxed the assumption of sOffer and
extend it to the case that the clearing price p(t) is unknown. We proposed to submit multiple
offers to alleviate its negative impact. To investigate how many offers are sufficient for mOffer to
achieve the same performance level as sOffer, in Fig. 8, we vary the number of offers from 1 to
15. The notable observation is that submitting 1 or 2 offers is not sufficient. However, with 3
or more offers the performance is quite similar to sOffer in which the price is known in advance.
In the last experiment, we increase the maximum error of renewable output emax and calculate
the profit of gOffer. The result shows that gOffer is robust to forecasting error that belows 20%,
and the obtained profit decreases rapidly as error increases beyond 20%. Concluding above, these
experiments demonstrate that the negative impact of the uncertainty in the clearing price can
be effectively mitigated by multiple offer submissions. However, accurate short-term renewable
forecasting is vital for srGENCO to obtain a desired profit, since the errors higher than 20% can
severely degrade the performance.
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6 Conclusion
This paper proposes competitive offering strategies for maximizing the profit of a renewable power
producer with storage in hour-ahead market. The underlying problem is coupled over time and the
input to the problem is revealed in an online fashion, both of which make the problem challenging.
We first tackle a basic setting and propose algorithm for it. And in two successive steps we relax
the basic assumptions and generalize our solutions and analysis to the realistic scenario. Our
analytical results characterize competitive ratios for all the proposed algorithms. Finally, trace-
driven evaluations demonstrate the close-to-optimal performance of our algorithms.
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.1 proof of Lemma 3.2
Lemma .1 Under some worst case ω∗, assume mint∈T zsOfferω∗ (t) = b then we have p(t) ≤ g(b) + σ
for any σ > 0.
Proof: Assume there’s a time slot that p(t) ≥ g(b) + σ under some worst case ω∗. If xOFAω∗ (t) ≤
xsOfferω∗ (t), we just construct another worst case which replaces the t− th input (p(t), u(t)) with the
following input sequence:
p′(t) = g(zsOfferω∗ (t) + u(t)) + σ, u
′(t) = u(t),
p′(t+ 1) = g(zsOfferω∗ (t+ 1)) + σ, u
′(t+ 1) = 0,
p′(t+ 2) = g(zsOfferω∗ (t+ 2)) + σ, u
′(t+ 2) = 0,
...
p′(t+N) = g(zsOfferω∗ (t) + u(t)− xsOfferω∗ (t)), u′(t+N) = 0
where N = dxsOfferω∗ (t)/σe. In this way, the profit earned by sOffer decreases while that of OFA keep
unchanged. This contradicts the assumption at the beginning. Then we complete the proof.
We adopt a worst-case analysis approach to prove Lemma 3.2. We assume the state of storage
under online algorithm reaches the minimum value bi at time T1 and keeps unchanged until time
T2.
If there’s no injection into the storage during [1, T2], according to Lemma .1, the maximum market
clearing price [1, T1] is g(bi) and the maximum profit earned by OFA during [1, T1] is g(bi)C. The
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minimum profit earned by the online algorithm is
∑bn
k=bi+1
g(k), so it’s immediate that the maximum
profit ratio is g(bi)C/
∑bn
k=bi+1
g(k).
(a) If there’s energy stored into the battery during [1, T2], we can assume the last time interval
with energy stored is TI = [T3, T4] ⊂ [1, T2]. During TI , the state of storage under sOffer will
keep increasing or unchanged. Then the off-line algorithm will commit X =
∑
t∈TI u(t) amount of
energy before T3 with lower price than g(bi). Moreover, we assume at time T5, the state of storage
under sOffer reaches zω
∗
sOffer(T3) for the last time during [1, T2]. Then the committed energy during
[T3, T5] by sOffer is equal to that by OFA.
If
g(zω
∗
sOffer(T3)− 1)X
zω
∗
sOffer(T3)+X∑
k=zω
∗
sOffer(T3)+1
g(k)
> crbi(sOffer)
we can easily get that:
crΩsOffer
zω
∗
sOffer
(T3)
(sOffer) ≥ (g(z
ω∗
sOffer(T3)) + 1)z
ω∗
sOffer(T3)
xω
∗
sOffer(T3)∑
k=bn
g(k)
≥ (g(z
ω∗
sOffer(T3)) + 1)X
zω
∗
sOffer(T3)+X∑
k=zω
∗
sOffer(T3)+1
g(k)
> crΩsOfferbi
(sOffer)
Thus, for the worst case, if the maximum profit ratio within the case set ΩsOfferbi satisfies crΩsOfferbi
(sOffer) ≥
crΩsOfferbk
(sOffer) for k = i+ 1, i+ 2, . . . , n−1, there’s no stored energy during [1, T2] under the worst
case.
(b) If there’is energy committed by sOffer during [T3 + 1, T ] under the worst case, we can assume
the period with energy committed during [T3 + 1, T ] by sOffer is TD = [T6, T7]. And assume the
time that the state of battery first reaches b0 = z
∗
sOffer(T7) at time T8. It’s easy to verify that, at
time T7 and T8, the state of storage under OFA is 0. So the committed energy by OFA algorithm
during [T3 + 1, T7], denoted by X
′ is equal to that by sOffer. During TD, the profit earned by
online algorithm is at least
∑zω∗sOffer(T6)
k=zω
∗
sOffer(T6)−X′
g(k), and the maximum profit earned by the OFA is
(g(zω
∗
sOffer(T6)) +X
′)X ′.
If
(g(zω
∗
sOffer(T7))− 1)X ′
zω
∗
sOffer(T6)∑
k=zω
∗
sOffer(T6)−X′
g(k)
> crΩsOfferbi
(sOffer)
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we can easily get that:
crΩsOffer
zω
∗
sOffer
(T6)
(sOffer) ≥(g(z
ω∗
sOffer(T6))− 1)zω
∗
sOffer(T6)
zω
∗
sOffer(T6)∑
k=bn
g(k)
≥(g(z
ω∗
sOffer(T6))− 1)X ′
zω
∗
sOffer(T6)∑
k=zω
∗
sOffer(T6)−X′
g(k)
>crΩsOfferbi
(sOffer)
Thus, for the worst case, if the maximum profit ratio within the case set ΩsOfferbi satisfies crΩsOfferbi
(sOffer) ≥
CRΩsOfferbk
(sOffer) for k = i + 1, i + 2, . . . , n − 1, there’s no energy committed during [T3 + 1, T ] by
sOffer, and the maximum profit gained by the off-line algorithm is
∑bn−1
k=bi−1+1 g(k).
Concluding (a) and (b), we complete the proof.
.2 proof of Lemma 3.3
Given l1, l2, . . . , ln, solving (20) can be formulated as the following problem:
min : y
subject to: y ≥
piC+
n−1∑
k=i+1
pklk
n∑
k=i+1
pklk
i = 2, 3, . . . , n− 1
pmin ≤ pi ≤ pmax i = 2, 3, . . . , n− 1
var : y, pi i = 2, 3, . . . , n− 1
The hessian matrix of the non-equality constraints is:
0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0 0
0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0 −li+1
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0 −ln−1
0 · · · 0 −li+1 · · · −ln−1 0

Given lk > 0 for k = 1, 2, · · · , n−1, the hessian matrix is positive semi-definite. Then we can verify
that the nonlinear constraints are convex.
By partially dualizing on the first set of non-equality constrains, we can get the following Lagrangian
function:
L(y,µ) = y +
n−1∑
i=2
µi(piC +
n−1∑
k=i+1
pklk − y
n∑
k=i
pklk)
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where µi, i = 2, 3, . . . , n− 1 are the dual variables associated with the non-equality constraints.
Then the first-order optimality necessary condition is:
1−
n−1∑
i=2
µi
n∑
k=2
pklk = 0
µi+1C − li
i∑
k=2
(y − 1)µk = 0, i = 2, 3, . . . , n− 1
Note that y > 1, 0 < li < C and pmin ≤ pi ≤ pmax for i = 2, 3, . . . , n− 1. Then by above equation,
we can derive that µi > 0, i = 2, 3, ·, n − 1. Moreover, according to the complementary slackness
condition:
µi(pi−1C +
n−1∑
k=i
pklk − y
n∑
k=i
pklk) = 0, i = 2, 3, . . . , n− 1
we can get that the followings always hold:
pi−1C +
n−1∑
k=i
pklk − y
n∑
k=i
pklk = 0, i = 2, 3, . . . , n− 1
or
pi−1C +
n−1∑
k=i
pklk
n∑
k=i
pklk
= y, i = 2, 3, . . . , n− 1
Then we complete the proof.
.3 proof of Lemma 3.4
Proof: If pn−1 9 pn for the optimal g(z), we can assume there’s another function g′(z) which
contains n + 1 steps. We let g′(z) = g(z) for z = 1, 2, . . . , bn−1, bn−1 + 1, bn−1 + 2, . . . , bn and
g′(bn−1 +1) = (pn−1 +pn)/2. According to Lemma 3.2, easily we can get that the competitive ratio
with g′(z) under the subsets satisfy the followings:
pn−1+pn
2 C
p1(ln − 1) <
p2C
p1ln
piC +
∑n−1
k=i+1 pklk +
pn−1+pn
2∑n−1
k=i+1 pklk +
pn−1+pn
2 + p1(ln − 1)
<
piC +
∑n−1
k=i+1 pklk∑n
k=i+1 pklk
That means the competitive ratio with g′(z) is smaller than that with g(z), contradicting the
assumption that g(z) is the optimal. This completes the proof.
.4 proof of Theorem 4.1
Proof: Following similar lines with Lemma 3.3 and .1, we can find that the worst instance for
mOffer is similar to sOffer. For any worst instance ω, if zωmOffer(t) > z
ω
sOffer(t)(1 + 1/m), it can
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be verified that xsOffer(t) < xmOffer(t), t ∈ T must hold according to the algorithm rules. So the
cumulative profit difference between mOffer and sOffer at time slot t is bounded by p(t)zωsOffer(t)/m
under ω. So we have:
cr(mOffer) ≤ max
t∈T
ROFA(ω) + p(t)z
ω
sOffer(t)/m
RsOffer(ω)
≤ cr(sOffer) + max
t∈T
p(t)zωsOffer(t)/m
RsOffer(ω)
Moreover, for any time slot t, the following inequality always hold:
p(t)zωsOffer(t)/m
RsOffer(ω)
≤ g((1− 1/m)z
ω
sOffer(t))z
ω
sOffer(t)/m∫ C
zωsOffer(t)
g(z)dz
≤ g((1− 1/m)c
th)(C − cth)/m∫ C
cth g(z)dz
≤ θcr(sOffer)
m2
The above inequality use the result that p(t) ≤ g((1 − 1/m)zωsOffer(t)) under the worst case ω and
that g(z) is convex.
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